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What Mystery of Moral Experience? 
Benedict Smith 
Durham University 
 
 
1. The Problem with Our Ordinary Moral Practice 
 
According to Michael Smith, a “central organizing problem” in contemporary 
metaethics concerns a particular way in which our moral thought and practice is or at 
least appears mysterious.
1
 Our “ordinary moral practice” and the “facts of ordinary 
moral experience,” he says, contain features which are incontrovertible but mutually 
incompatible.
2
 The features, taken individually, account for some of the basic and 
inalienable characteristics of our moral thought but they are, on his view, jointly 
inconsistent. Broadly speaking the features are objectivity and practicality. As Smith 
puts it: “The problem is that the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgment pull 
in quite opposite directions from each other…. The objectivity of moral judgement 
suggests that there are moral facts beliefs about what these facts are ... but it leaves 
entirely mysterious how or why having a moral view is supposed to have special links 
with [motivation]…. The practicality of moral judgement suggests just the opposite, that 
our moral judgements express our desires…. While this enables us to make good sense 
of the link [with motivation], it leaves entirely mysterious what a moral argument is 
supposed to be an argument about.”3  
Let us understand what is meant by the mystery or problem in line with the 
intention Smith expresses as something which has an explanation, if baffling at first. But 
the formulation Smith gives of the problem, its standard formulation, involves a 
problematic psychological account of moral experience. The psychological account 
involves assuming that moral experience, and what is manifest in ordinary practice, can 
be accounted for in terms of propositional attitudes, an assumption which drives how the 
problem is characterized and proposed solutions to it. We need not deny that moral 
experience can be problematic or mysterious. The principal issue is that the standard 
view of what constitutes the mystery casts the problem in psychological terms, where 
the source of the problem is an alleged incompatibility of mental states. 
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The idea is that although our moral thought and practice is apparently coherent, it 
is, mysteriously, made up of elements that cannot be coherently combined. On an 
alternative view, moral experience and the ordinary facts which constitute it are not 
exhausted by our mental states and cannot be exhausted by them. Much of the basic 
stuff of moral experience has nothing to do with our mental life at all. The ordinary 
facts of moral thought, discourse, and experience are not well accounted for, let alone 
exhausted by facts about our mental states or propositional attitudes. 
 
 
2. Mental States and the So-called Facts of Moral Experience 
 
It is widely agreed that our moral experience seems at least suggests the presence of 
objective values, properties, events, and states of affairs. This aspect of our evaluative 
phenomenology finds expression in verbal forms as well is in other modes of practice. 
We make assertions such as stealing is wrong and being honest is right. We think of 
moral judgments as true or false and use moral predicates in describing our behavior. 
Our moral thought involves trying to think, talk, and act in ways that are right, where 
the rightness involved is taken to be independently constituted by the way the world is. 
With our moral thought and discourse, we aspire to represent such objective facts which 
obtain, when they do, independently of our practices of representation, assertion, and 
description. On the standard formulation, this feature is captured by the familiar claim 
about our psychology that the means by which we try to represent the world correctly is 
by having and expressing beliefs about the world. Central to our moral experience is 
also a practical, motivational aspect captured by a claim about a different aspect of our 
psychology that moral judgment involves having and expressing desires which are 
constitutively motivational. 
Typically, beliefs and desires share a common feature in that both have 
representational content, if of different sorts. Beliefs have representational content in so 
far as with them, we seek to represent the way the world really is. Desires have 
representational content in so far as with them we represent how the world is to be.4 The 
source of the mystery lies in how our moral thought and practice can be, as it appears to 
be, genuinely answerable to the world and intrinsically practical, a combination of both 
objective and practical purport. A diagnosis of this fact could lead us to suppose that our 
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mental economy contains other special kinds of composite psychological states, 
socalled besires, for instance.
5
 Besires are mental states that are adequate for playing 
both objective and practical roles. They satisfy both directions of fit, in the sense 
considered by G. E. M. Anscombe.
6
 
The existence of besires would at least show that the standard picture of human 
psychology is insufficient and would give us reason to reject the suggestion that our 
moral thought could be exhaustively decomposed in to beliefs and desires. Whether or 
not we agree that besires are a justified addition to our mental economy or that they play 
the right kind of explanatory role, besires are nevertheless mental states. Thus we could 
say that while the mystery has its source in the alleged conflict between kinds of mental 
states, proposed solutions involve the introduction of other kinds of mental states that 
could supposedly account for the objective and practical character of moral thought. 
Thus what is being proposed as a solution to the problem of an impoverished 
philosophical psychology is a replacement philosophical psychology. But this shifts the 
problem of accounting for moral experience and practice in psychological terms instead 
of dealing with it. 
The pervasive character and distinctive features of the philosophical psychology 
at issue is Humean. It is central to the standard formulation of the mystery. The features 
of our experience are characterized as incompatible by Humean psychology according 
to which desires are the primary motivational force for action. This illuminates the 
mystery implied by the objective feature, since the relevant mental state captured by 
objectivity cannot accommodate this aspect. One of the central tenets of Humean 
psychology is the division of relevant propositional attitudes into either beliefs or 
desires. What is emphasized is how such basic mental states are distinct existences, as 
Hume understood them to be, and how they can motivate a person to act. 
Let us imagine that the moral thought and experience of a person corresponds to 
the problem that Smith outlines. Furthermore, let us suppose that the person is able to 
enjoy each of the practical and objective aspects of moral experience somehow in 
isolation from the other, and thus their phenomenology tracks the distinctness between 
beliefs and desires. In considering the practical aspect, the person recognizes that this 
makes good sense, as Smith puts it, of the pre-philosophical connection between moral 
judgement and action. We may suppose that it simply does not occur to him that it has 
any problematic implications for any other aspect of our thought or experience. It makes 
good sense, and that is that. Let us suppose that soon after, the person considers the 
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intellectual element in moral experience, and he similarly notes that this makes good 
sense of why moral experience appears to have objective purport and why we argue and 
try and get things right. It simply does not occur to him that it has any problematic 
implications for any other aspect of our thought or experience. The experience of the 
person is unlike the characterization Smith offers to the extent that no mystery or 
problem presents itself. We may ask if something is missing from the experience and 
the person is missing the mystery. 
Perhaps the description of this case is misleading, since it is part of what it is to be 
practical or subjective that it is as such in tension somehow with what it is to be 
objective. We might think that the person is evidently not competent to consider his 
experience with sufficient sensitivity, since the relevant competence would make him 
aware that the mystery is already implied by each of the practical and objective 
elements, even if taken independently. This would be a failure in conceptual 
competence or some failure to understand or properly interpret just what is presented in 
experience. If the person can understand that the aspect of experience on which he is 
focused is objective, then he will understand, a priori, that the content is incompatible 
with the practical content of moral experience. Perhaps experience of each element is 
needed to make the relevant understanding lively to his mind, as Hume would say, but 
the understanding would not positively depend on such experience. Even if this is right, 
from within the constraints of Humean psychology it is unclear whether the relevant 
kind of understanding is intellectual or practical. 
Phenomenologically, beliefs and desires are not often experienced as distinct. 
Someone believing that his daughter is playing the violin in a school concert is not felt 
as distinct from his desiring to hear her play. Such cases are part of the ordinary facts of 
experience. Proponents of Humean psychology insist that, despite the phenomenology, 
beliefs and desires can be pulled apart “at least modally,” as Smith puts it.7 The states 
are exclusive in that neither can fulfill the role taken by the other, and yet this fact is 
problematic when considering the overall nature of our moral thought and practice. In 
considering this, we are bound to consider both the intellectual and the practical features 
that in combination make up moral thought and practice, not just one of them somehow 
on its own. Nevertheless the assumption is that, notwithstanding the appearances, it is 
possible decompose the ordinary facts of moral experience into beliefs and desires, 
mental states the contents and roles of which are mutually exclusive. The assumption in 
large part serves as the source of the mystery since, given the disjunction, it is quite 
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unclear how moral experience appears simultaneously to combine both elements. This 
view rests on it being plausible that we can describe, interpret, and understand our 
moral thought and experience in terms of mental states and the relations between them. 
The view is also motivated by a questionable characterization of what counts as the 
appearances and of what is involved in identifying them. 
 
 
3. Psychology and Metaphysics 
 
Let us assume that ordinary moral practice contains an objective feature and a practical 
feature which are “the exact opposite of each other.”8 The objective feature is partly 
constituted by our expressing beliefs, and the practical feature partly involves 
expressing our desires. Beliefs and desires are both propositional attitudes with their 
own distinctive forms of representational content and directions of fit. The objective 
feature implies that the constraint in light of which beliefs fail or succeed in being true 
is set by the nature of the world. It is commonly assumed that neither beliefs nor the 
features of the world that they are purported to represent can be intrinsically 
motivational. Some philosophers appeal to an alleged metaphysical truth that as a matter 
of fact, the world simply does not contain such features since they would breach a range 
of central metaphysical commitments.
9 
The commitments rule out there being features 
of the world that are objective and practical, external to our minds yet, per impossibile, 
intrinsically connected to our will. Admitting such objective yet intrinsically motivating 
features of the world would, supposedly, contravene the best undertanding of the 
universe that we currently have and the best accounts of the ways in which we know 
about the universe. Proponents of the standard formulation could embrace this 
understanding through premises about the content and significance of mental states. 
The strategy would thus draw metaphysical conclusions from psychological premises. 
The denial that there are objective and motivational facts in the world is taken to be 
directly supported by psychological theory. As Smith puts it: “the standard picture of 
human psychology tells us that there are no such facts.”10 In looking at the nature and 
role of our mental states and by employing the standard theory, Humean psychology, 
we can come to know that the world must be bereft of objective moral values. 
Accordingly, even if the fabric of the world was, as J. L. Mackie put it, queer 
enough so as to include objective yet intrinsically motivating properties, we would not 
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have at our disposal anything like the right kind of psychological state that would 
provide us with awareness of such properties. The nature and representational content of 
beliefs is inadequate to capture the practical aspect, and the nature and representational 
content of desire is inadequate to capture the objective aspect. The fabled properties 
would simply remain invisible even if our relevant psychological states and capacities 
were well-stocked and finely-tuned. On the view that Mackie sets out, defending the 
idea that we can know about objective values would involve appealing to “special 
faculty of moral perception” or “a strange sort of intuition.”11 Translated into the 
psychological vocabulary of the standard model, any awareness of objective yet 
motivational features of the world would presumably involve a strange sort of mental 
state wholly at odds with the standard understanding of human psychology. 
 
 
4. Appearances and Inner and Outer Phenomena 
 
Advocates of the standard account propose an analysis of the elements manifest in 
ordinary moral practice and of the ordinary facts of moral experience. These aspects of 
our lives are, presumably, meant to be pre-philosophical in the sense that they are the 
things of which a philosophical analysis is provided. Our practice and experience 
constitute what is often regarded as the principal data, so to speak, for such analysis. 
Conventionally the data is characterized as the elements manifest in ordinary practice. 
Often competing philosophical accounts of our moral thought are assessed partly 
according to how successful they are in saving the appearances, the extent to which a 
given theory accounts for the ordinary features manifest in moral practice and 
experience. Whatever the credentials of this way of assessing proposed accounts of our 
moral thought and practice, the standard formulation of the mystery involves a mistaken 
focus on the appearances as they are manifested at the psychological or mental level. 
The error is not that focusing on this level is mistaken as such but that the focus is 
bound to exclude much of what ought to count as falling within the class of moral 
appearances. This exclusion results in the ordinary features of moral experience being 
substituted by the ordinary features of our psychological lives. We should resist this, 
since the moral appearances and the ordinary facts of experience cannot be reduced to 
facts about our mental states. What counts as the moral appearances ought to include, 
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among other things: aspects of interpersonal dialogue including the variety of non-
linguistic behavior and activities that is partly constitutive of interpersonal 
understanding; regulative ideals that govern the logic of moral thought such as 
convergence of opinion, norms regulating the articulation; criticism, and defense of 
moral views; patterns of thought and argument regulated by inter-subjective agreement; 
the expression and discussion of moral emotions; witnessing the behavior of people; 
and seeing the effects of our decisions. Also included would be, as Smith 
acknowledges, rampant cruelty, systematic injustice, and moral indifference.
12
 These 
elements are part of what is constituted by ordinary moral experience and thought, but 
none of them are mental states or propositional attitudes. 
It might be said in response that such things nevertheless require some kind of 
mental state such as a belief to mediate our access to such non-mental features or states 
of affairs. For instance, for rampant cruelty to figure as a constituent of moral 
experience we would need a belief that there is rampant cruelty in the world. 
Furthermore, if mental states or propositional attitudes were needed to act as conduits 
for all the constituents of moral experience, then this would imply that there could be no 
appearances without the relevant kind of mental state to serve as mediator, no 
appearances if there were no mental states to illuminate them. Few philosophers would 
defend the idea that rampant cruelty is simply a mental state, but it is only marginally 
less implausible to say that cruelty appears in our moral thought and discourse only 
because we have beliefs that it exists and desires that we act collectively to eliminate it. 
It is not a plausible view, since many things that figure in the ordinary stream of moral 
experience resist characterization in psychological terms. 
Describing features such as non-linguistic behavior and rampant cruelty as part of 
the moral appearances assumes a wide-scope use of the term “appearance” that is well 
accommodated by what is presumably meant by the ordinary facts of moral experience. 
The suggestion is not that it is never appropriate to say that beliefs mediate or constitute 
the appearances but that the moral appearances exceed well beyond what can be 
captured by applying mental state terms. There are, then, good reasons to distinguish 
between the different senses with which “appearance” is used. For instance, it can be 
used to refer to the domain of appearances appropriate to describing them in the context 
of thought, and it can also be used to refer to the domain of appearances appropriate to 
describing them in the context of our experience of the world. Constituents of the 
context of our experience incorporate outer phenomena and cannot be adequately 
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understood or accounted for by attending to our psychological states. The domain of 
inner phenomena, in contrast, is constituted by psychological states or episodes such as, 
centrally, beliefs, and desires. That sense of “appearance” is narrow in scope and is used 
to refer to psychological content rather than features of the world outside of the minds 
and attitudes of persons. 
The standard account of the mystery of moral experience would have us 
misappropriate the distinction in the scopes of “appearance,” since there is an 
unwarranted priority assigned to appearances in the narrow, psychological sense. This 
motivates the view of psychological content as mediator. For example, although it is 
conceded that rampant cruelty is part of our moral experience broadly construed, and 
that such states of affairs are at least notionally unlike propositional attitudes, our 
recognition of such states of affairs is articulated through the medium of Humean 
psychology as mysteriously combing both objective and practical features. The problem 
is that in implicitly treating one realm of appearances as if it could be reduced to or 
substituted by another realm, proponents of the strategy would have us suppose that the 
ordinary facts of moral experience are facts about our psychology. But this is not just a 
problem about a proposed reduction of one kind of appearance to another. It also 
reflects a deeper problem about what it takes for us to identify and understand our 
mental states. Criticizing the psychological account of moral experience should not be 
taken to imply an exclusive distinction between, on the one hand, an inner realm of 
psychological states and, on the other, a non-mental realm of worldly properties and 
states of affairs. There is nothing about this distinction that implies that it is absolute. 
Let us consider cases of our needing to find out whether we believe something, a 
process which is arguably a fundamental feature of our lives, particularly our moral 
lives. The process need not involve a form of introspection or attending to our inner 
mental lives. For instance, Gareth Evans argues that in determining whether we believe 
that something is the case, we ordinarily do not inwardly glance toward an interior 
psychological realm. As he puts it: “If someone asks me ‘Do you believe that there is 
going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same 
outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be 
a third world war?’”13 
As Evans sees it, understanding the nature of our mental capacities, including the 
nature of belief, need not involve some scanning of our inner lives. In understanding the 
nature of belief and of whether or not we have a particular belief vital for understanding 
  
9 
our mystery, our “eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – 
upon the world.”14 This suggests that determining whether we have a belief that 
something is the case will be a matter, at least some of the time, of attending to the 
appearances in the wide-scope sense, to the features that constitute the ordinary and 
non-psychological constituents of our moral experience. Evans explains that in 
affirming some belief or judgment, we look at the world. We do not need to “in any 
sense gaze at, or concentrate upon, [our] internal state.”15 This supports a wider view 
about what we should take as the ordinary features of experience in the current sense, 
even if it is agreed that beliefs play a central role. What matters is where we look, as it 
were, to find out about what constitutes our moral experience and what is manifest in 
our moral thought and practice. 
Interpreting appearances in the narrow, psychological sense is not an error as 
such. We can insist on the importance of the moral appearances without rendering them 
in purely psychological terms. The appearances have a fundamentally important 
methodological and phenomenological role in moral philosophy. For example, 
according to Aristotle, in ethical inquiry we ought to: “first set out the way things 
appear to people, and then, having gone through the puzzles, proceed to prove the 
received opinions about these ways of being affected – at best, all of them, or, failing 
that, most, and the most authoritative. For if the problems are resolved, and received 
opinions remain, we shall have offered sufficient proof.”16 Ideally, the appearances are 
saved by a philosophical account of the phenomena under question and our 
investigations, ideally, vindicate received opinions. In the context, Aristotle is 
embarking on a discussion of akrasia, although the principle of saving the appearances 
is one that has wide application. In contemporary moral theory, the use of this principle 
has been a central way to organize debates about whether forms of realism or 
expressivism offer the best account of our moral thought, practice, and discourse.
17
 In 
the present context, the principle of saving the phenomena is also important for 
recognizing the different realms of appearance. For instance, taking the principle 
seriously means that in characterizing the moral phenomena we ought to attend to 
features of our experience that cannot be translated into the framework of mental states. 
Whether or not an Aristotelian would endorse the idea that clarifying the appearances 
needs to focus exclusively on the character and interplay between mental states, 
Aristotle was not uninterested in psychology, and his deployment of the principle of 
saving the appearances shows that what falls within the scope of phenomena is complex 
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and wide-ranging. 
 
 
5. A Different Mystery? 
 
What is constituted by the moral appearances is complex and we should proceed 
carefully when considering what it is that we take as manifest in ordinary thought and 
discourse. Part of the assumption that our moral thought and experience can be 
translated into propositional attitudes reflects substantive commitments at the 
philosophical level, and this brings into question the legitimacy of idea that the 
appearances constitute a set of pre-philosophical data. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, for 
example, suggests that the moral problem or mystery in the standard formulation might 
be better thought of as a meta-ethical problem that emerges at the level of second-order 
analysis, once distinctively philosophical assumptions are operating.
18
 Challenging the 
characterization of the mystery in this way does not exhibit skepticism about second 
order analyses as such but suggests that we need to take a view about whether the 
appearances that are at the focus of the standard formulation are in fact the shadows of 
technical and controversial theses in philosophical psychology and beyond. But, as 
Smith explains: “what metaethical reflection suggests, at least initially, is that the very 
idea of being morally required to act in some way or other is all a total sham: nothing 
could be everything a moral requirement purports to be. When people become 
convinced moral skeptics for this sort of reason and then go on to acquire an 
indifference to the suffering of others, as so many certainly do, the problems the rest of 
us face become acute.”19 He adds that the cause of the first-order moral problem “is not 
the fact that moral thought is incoherent” but instead “the fact that it is believed to be 
incoherent when it is not.”20 Meta-ethical reflection is in some sense the source of and 
also the solution to the problem that Smith is concerned to identify. Sayre-McCord 
suggests that a form of moral skepticism can follow from reflection, since someone 
could become aware of the sham and put the knowledge into practice, so to speak. Such 
a person could thereby become indifferent to the suffering of others.
21
 That some of us 
do not become moral skeptics in the light of meta-ethical reflection suggests either that 
the content of such reflection is itself different for non-skeptics or that some other 
thoughts prevent the meta-ethical skepticism from infiltrating our first-order discourse 
and practice. Smith would deny that there is a difference in the content of reflection 
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between philosophers who do and do not become skeptics. Meta-ethical reflection as 
such suggests that the very idea of being morally required to do one thing as opposed to 
another is a sham. But the sham is only an initial suggestion, not a conclusion to serve 
as the basis of action or, if indifference does express the relevant kind of skepticism, the 
basis of inaction. The proposal that Smith makes is to solve the moral problem, whether 
or not it comes to infect first-order practice, by showing how moral requirements flow 
from what it is to be a thinking, reflective, rational creature. These are just the features 
that skeptics must admit that they have, since their indifference arises from rational 
reflection on what morality appears to be.
22
 
Whether the proposal that Smith makes is a good response to moral skepticism is 
not of central concern. The claim is only that the problem or mystery of moral 
experience as revealed through meta-ethical reflection need not threaten to undermine 
morality. What is initially suggested by reflection need not be some curious fact about 
our thought and discourse that can jeopardize the very idea of morality. Instead, as Kant 
suggests, the mystery of moral experience can sustain our moral lives. It could be an 
important part of what gives moral thought and discourse its character. Kant wrote of 
the “strangeness” of how moral demands in the form of the moral law are experienced 
as independent of our inclinations and how this is “mysterious and wonderful.”23 As a 
rationalist alternative to the account of motivation and the wider philosophical 
psychology provided by a Humean framework, Kant offers a way to regard a certain 
type of reason as the essentially motivating force in ethics.
24
 
The kind of psychological approach to moral experience we have considered is 
often taken for granted and to a large extent it thus shapes what the initial problem or 
mystery is to which philosophers respond. For instance, according to Alison Denham: 
“No doubt there really is much about morality which is genuinely mysterious, but that is 
because human psychology is mysterious.”25 In the context, the point is directed toward 
what she describes as an easy view in moral epistemology in which it is held that moral 
perception is a sui generis faculty of knowing. That thought, according to Denham, can 
be attractive to some of us since it “imbues moral phenomena with a pleasing air of 
mystery.”26 Viewing moral phenomena as mysterious could be pleasing, since it would 
apparently help preserve the autonomous character of ethics and thus protect against 
prevalent forms of reductionist naturalism, if we were inclined to feel the need for such 
protection. Denham suggests that the mystery of moral experience is a function of the 
mystery of human psychology; but there is no compelling reason why we must choose 
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between either accounting for the mystery in psychological terms or embracing the idea 
that the mystery is a result of some sui generis qualities or properties of moral 
phenomena wholly independent of psychology and a broader naturalist framework. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The standard formulation of the mystery encourages us to attend to mental states, to the 
logic of propositional attitudes and their relations to the exclusion of other important 
features of moral experience. We cannot hope to describe adequately our moral 
experience if we characterize it in wholly psychological terms that are used to refer only 
to inward phenomena. The motivation for analyzing the ordinary features of experience 
in psychological terms comes from a tacit commitment to the primacy of psychology. 
Overall, our moral thought and practice is said to contain a mystery or problem, but the 
mystery is generated by the incompatibility of mental states. The standard formulation 
need not explicitly restrict the focus on aspects of our psychology but there is, 
nevertheless, a problematic switch between domains of phenomena. An explanation of 
why our overall moral thought and practice contains a mystery ultimately will be 
framed in terms of psychological states even though the mystery is said to pervade our 
moral thought and discourse. What explains the occurrence of the mystery is that the 
complex array of outer phenomena can be interpreted as either being intellectual or 
practical which, in turn, are captured by the two cardinal psychological states of belief 
and desire. The relevant propositional attitudes have distinct metaphysical, semantic, 
and epistemological roles, but both share the same psychological space, as it were. Thus 
there has been a slide between two senses of the phenomena, an outward sense and an 
inner sense, and the two have been conflated. 
Moral experience may nonetheless contain features that are difficult to reconcile 
or that our moral lives are in any sense mysterious. To neglect those aspects of our 
moral lives would be to neglect core features of our experience and to risk turning moral 
reflection, as Martha Nussbaum has put it something “hopelessly flat, tedious, 
underambitious.”27 Nevertheless, a particular account of what the mystery amounts to, 
one that is characterized as something that can be identified and explained with 
reference only to psychological considerations, is misleading. It is misleading because it 
runs together different domains of phenomena, and illicitly substitutes one for the other 
and by doing so presents a restrictive conception of what the mystery amounts to. In 
particular, it implies that the mystery is, in essence, a psychological mystery that comes 
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into view through analysis of mental states and their relations. As such, saving the 
phenomena becomes a task of describing the salient characteristics of our inner 
psychological lives. 
What constitutes the ethical appearances is not a question that can be analyzed 
into a question about states of mind. As a contribution to the task of elucidating our 
moral experience, Smith has provided an influential framework for further discussion. 
But there is more to the mystery or the problem of moral experience than can be 
accommodated by invoking propositional attitudes and the apparent tension between 
them. Providing a comprehensive and in-depth account of what the ordinary facts of 
moral experience amount to is an important and daunting task and we should do more 
than glancing inward if we want to understand what they are.
28
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